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Chapter 5

A Retrospective on the Negative Income
Tax Experiments: Looking Back at the
Most Innovate Field Studies in Social
Policy
Robert A. Levine, Harold Watts, Robinson Hollister, Walter Williams,
Alice O 'Connor, and Karl Widerquist

Introduction, Karl Widerquist
The United States government conducted four negative income tax (NIT) experiments between 1968 and l 980. NIT is a form of basic income guarantee (BIG)
that was popular in the 1960s and 1970s. It differs from basic income in that it
gives money only to those with low incomes. However, both are basic income
guarantees in the sense that they guarantee everyone a minimum income. Although
the differe nces between the two policies are important, they have enough
similarities so that what was learned from the NIT experiments can help us
understand the conseq uences of either BTG plan.
The experiments began under the direction of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) near the end of the Johnson administration and continued within the
Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) after the Nixon administrati on abolished OEO. Their main goal was to determine the labor supply response
to an income guarantee. That is, how much will work effort decline if a negative
income tax is introduced? But as the experiments went on, many more questions
were examined. The first experiments were cond ucted in New Jersey and
Pe nnsylvania between 1968 and 1972, on a large ly urban population of two-parent
fam ilies. Two more experiments were soon added-one in Gary, Indiana to examine the effects of an N IT on single parents, and one in North Carolina and Iowa
to examine its effects on rural populations. Finally the Seattle- Denver Income
Maintenance Experiment (S IME- DIME) was added with a much larger experimental population.
These experiments were the first large scale social science experiment ever
conducted, and they have become a model for social experiments. They employed
the method (common in the natural sciences) of dividi ng subjects into a control
group and an experimental group through random assignment. The experimental
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group was given a negative income tax and the control group was not. Researchers
collected income information and conducted interviews with both groups to
determine how those receiving the NIT behaved compared to those not receiving it.
The experiments eventual ly included thousands of subjects and collected data on
variables such as time spent working (for all members of the fami ly), school
attendance, health, and marital status.
The experiment's results were widely discussed in policy circles and in the
popular media at two times. In 1970, Nixon's modified version of the NIT, the
Family Assistance Plan, was being debated in Congress. To help its policy cause,
the administration pressed experimenters to release their findings long before they
were ready to do so. While preliminary results showed very moderate reductions in
labor supply due to work-incentive effects, Congressional opponents criticized the
find ings as prematw-e.
The results were again discussed in the late 1970s during hearings for Jimmy
Carter's Program for Better Jobs and Income. The finding that the work disincentive was not so large that it made the program unaffordable was overshadowed by
two other findings. Although the experimenters expected to find some negative
work incentive effects, and were pleased with how small they turned out to be,
many newspapers repo1ted the results as if the very existence of such effects was a
crushing blow to the idea. Also, a controversial finding that the negative income
tax increased the divorce rate caused a furor against the policy both in Congress
and the media.
In the following years, hundreds of articles in books and scholarly j ournals
debated the results of the NIT experiments. For a critical review and extensive bibliography, see Widerquist (2005).
In February 2002, the First Congress of the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network brought together four of the original experimenters and one historian to discuss the meaning of the experiments today. The session moderator was Robert
Harris, former executive director of the President's Commission on Income Maintenance, and former vice president of the Urban Institute. The speakers were
Robert Levine, senior economic consultant of the Rand Corporation and author of
The Poor Ye Need N ot Have With You: Lessons From the War on Poverty;
Robinson Hollister, professor of economics at Swaithmore College and coauthor of
Labor Market Policy and Unemployment Insurance; Harold Watts, emeritus professor of economics and public affairs at Columbia University, former director of
the Institute for Research on Poverty, and coeditor of The New Jersey Income
Maintenance Experiment, Volumes II and ill; Walter Williams, emeritus professor
of public affairs at the University of Washington, author of Honest Numbers and
Democracy: Social Policy Analysis in the White House, Congress, and the Federal
Agencies; and Alice O 'Connor, associate professor of histo1y at the University of
California- Santa Barbara, author of Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social
Policy and the Poor in Twentieth Century U.S. Histo,y . What follows is taken from
their remarks.
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The Political Background of the Experiments, Robert Levine
In the nineteenth century, economists were engaged in a great controversy over
whether something called "value" was determined by supply or demand. Around
the turn of the century some brilliant mind said "Why don't we substitute ' and' for
' or,' and make it 'supply and demand'?" The discussion today about jobs guarantees or income guarantees reminds me of that. The first formal proposal for a
negative income tax (NIT) by the United States government was made in the fiveyear antipoverty plan of 1965. NIT was very quickly thought to be in conflict with
a job guarantee. But the question of full employment or basic income guarantee
strikes me as a non-argument. That was the way some of us thought of it then, and
I still think that was the right way to think of it. But the negative income tax
experiment came out of that debate.
Part of the political context is well known, at least in our esoteric circles. A lice
O 'Connor quoted me in her book as saying that when we brought the idea of a NIT
to the high command of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the director
of congressional relations said "that won't be an experiment in negative income
tax, that will be an experiment on how to kill a program on the Hill." Sargent
Shriver, to his credit, dismissed that, even though he was a politician to his fingertips. He said, "No, this is important, this is interesting, and we will go ahead with
it." That was the political birth of the experiments that we're still discussing more
than 30 years later.
Some of the political background to the NIT in OEO has not been commonly
known. Because the money for the experiment was to be taken from the Community Action Demonstration Program (which had existed from the beginning of
OEO in 1965), there was a substantial sum of tens of millions of dollars avai lable.
Some of the more controversial demonstration programs were in Chicago and
Mississippi and a lot of the money was used to fund programs that were considered
not just intellectually, but politically, rad ical; and they caused OEO much trouble
at the time. Basically the accusation was made that the govenun ent was fund ing
political power.
Then, we came in; we were the reactionary economists who wanted to do
something else. Before I became assistant director of OEO, I was in charge of the
division of research and planning. Robinson Hollister succeeded me, Walter
Williams succeeded Rob. The only reason Harold Watts wasn' t in the sequence is
that he went back to Wisconsin before we could catch him. We wanted to try
science to find out something very specific. My colleagues will describe the
specifics, but we believed that the basic political obstacle to anything like a
negative income tax was the widespread belief that it would kill work incentives.
We set out not to prove that it would not, but to find out whether it would. That
was the very narrow, scientific focus of the experiment.
We set control groups to get info rmation on that particular topic, not to prove
anything to support an agenda. Community action people attacked from the left
and congressional people attacked from the right. Those attacking from the left
believed in " the culture of poverty" and didn't think income had much to do with
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why people were poor. Those on the right didn't !mow why we wanted to get this
information since the program was impossible anyhow. With Sh.river's aid, we got
through these obstacles.
After Nixon's election in 1968, it was generally felt within OEO that he was
going to kill the poverty program when he took over from Johnson. He didn't; he
appointed a new head of the program named Don Rumsfeld who brought in an
assistant named Dick Cheney. Rumsfeld systematically invited OEO folks to talk
to him in his congressional office. My impression was that he attempted to preserve the program by shifting it in a Republican direction-experimentation rather
than action. This put a focus on the NIT experiment.
The Makeup of the Experiments, Harold Watts

I understand that Sargent Sh.river said "We've got this institute up in Wisconsin
and they aren't good for anything else, so why don't we have them experiment?".
We took that as a serious recommendation. We took very seriously the question of
whether a set of programs would produce a generation of layabouts. That was the
hypothesis that needed to be examined. If you 're worried about the layabout possibility, you really want to start out with people who are working. And so the first
experiment did not look at the welfare population but at the working poor.
A negative income tax can be looked at as having two parts-a lump-sum grant
(G) and a reduced wage (Y-tY). From the standpoint of static economic theory,
both of those things should reduce the tendency to work. The lump sw11 grant
should produce more leisure and more non-wage work. The reduced price of
leisure, which comes from the reduced wage, should also produce more leisure:
"Time off is cheaper, let's buy some more of that." There was no question of the
direction of the effect of NIT on hours worked, and there was no lack of confmnation of that in the experiments. But the question was quantitative: How much
would NIT reduce work time? The same theory that says that people would definitely be inclined to work less also says that they are made better off, because the
NIT expands the alternatives available to them. This was confirmed because
almost no one refused to take part in the program. That part of economic theory
works fine.
But do we need an experiment to answer these questions? There are different
people at various levels of unearned income and different levels of net wage
running around loose in the streets. Why don't we just see what they do? The
experimental problem with using these people is that nothing is imposed from the
outside; there is no exogenous change. The experiment tried to make the change in
income and net wage rate exogenous, so that the behavior of recipients would be
representative of a national program.
The size of the work response was important, because if work effort declined
sufficiently it would largely vitiate the strategy of using the NIT as a means of
increasing family income. If recipients used their entire NIT to buy more leisure, it
succeeds in making them better off, but it wouldn't be a good antipoverty program.
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I want to emphasize a couple of ways the experiment tended to maximize the
size of the work-effort response. First, we applied no additional treatments that
would tend to prod them into the labor market. We had to check what they earned
to determine how much to pay them, but we weren't critical if they didn't work.
Second, it was a short-term experiment. In our case, essentially leisure was on sale
for a three-year period. When laundry soap is on sale, what do you do? You buy a
lot of it. You might expect people in the experiment to act the same way. Not
everyone will; someone who has a good job (it may not pay much, but it's stable)
may not want to mess arotmd with that by working less. That kind of rigidity could
be built into their job. But by and large the poor families we were looking at didn't
tend to have terribly steady jobs. There were a few with stable janitor jobs at
Princeton, but for the most part, that wasn't the case, and there was a disincentive.
People did work less, but percentage-wise it tended to be in the single digits for
men in particular. Some of the work response came from taking more time to look
for work. Some of it came from cutting down hours, say from 65 to 60 hours a
week, which doesn't seem like a tragedy. I don't remember finding anyone (on an
anecdotal basis), who as soon as they got the grant, left the labor market and sat on
the porch and whittled for three years.
That's what we found and those are the tools we used to find it. The whole
flavor of the OEO at that point was something rather new to the government: a
willingness to look at evidence, to do some examination, to check some facts out.
That hadn't always been there, and in that sense, this idea of doing some experimentation fell on fertile ground.
The Findings of the Experiments, Robinson Hollister

My part of this discussion covers three points. First, I review the results of the
experiments with respect to the labor supply, which was the central issue driving
the design of all these experiments. Second, I talk about the non-labor supply
outcomes that have largely been ignored and that covered a territory that was ahead
of its time in many ways. These bear heavily on what other benefits come from
having a basic income guarantee. Third, I map the findings of the experiments to
what we have fou nd since then.
Labor supply results showed about a I 3 percent reduction of work effort for the
family as a whole starting from an initial work effort of 3 5 hours per week for the
entire family. One-third of the response came from the primary earner, one-third
from the secondary earner, and one-third from the tertiary earner in the family. In
most cases, the primary earner worked more hours than the secondary and tertiary
earners, and therefore, when measured in percentage terms, there were relatively
small responses from the primary earner. Percentage term responses were much
bigger from the female spouses in the family and from the third workers in the
families. The biggest response overall came in reduction in the female labor supply
and that mostly took the form of slower reentry to the labor market after absence.
This labor supply response added about 25 percent to the static costs of a national
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program with a guarantee level approximately at the poverty line. You could look
at these results as either half empty or half full. You could say that 25 percent is
too much or not too much.
The most common non-labor supply result mentioned was an erroneous finding
by some sociologists (from an initial analysis of the Seattle- Denver Income
Maintenance Experiments) that the marriage-dissolution rate for black families in
the experimental groups was 57 percent greater than the control group, and 53
percent greater for white families. When these results came out in congressional
hearings, Senator Moynihan, who had been a backer of Nixon's Family Assistance
Plan, and who had written a very controversial report about instability in the black
family, recanted his support for the guaranteed income. Those particular findings
greatly contributed to killing the Ca1ter administration's guaranteed income
scheme. In the 1980s, Glen Cain carefully reanalyzed the data from the SeattleDenver experiment. The results were technically quite complicated, but there was
basically no family dissolution effect. Some of the results were suspect from the
beginning, because the effect seemed to occur in the sector of people with the
lowest guarantee rate, the lowest incentive to strike out on their own-those who
had the least to gain from breaking up showed the largest amount of marital
breakup. Cain's study appeared in the American Journal ofSociology in 1990, with
a rebuttal by the authors of the original findings, but subsequent studies (and those
from the other NIT experiments) also found no effects on marital stability.
The rural experiment in North Carolina and Iowa collected data on educational
attainment. In North Carolina there were significant positive influences in grades
2-8 in attendance rates and teacher rating, and on test scores. The literature on
education shows that it is nearly impossible to raise test scores through direct intervention. Yet, BIG had large positive effects on the test scores of children in the
worst-off families in the rural South. The New Jersey experiment didn't collect
data on test scores, but there was a very significant effect on school continuation;
that is, BIG was an effective anti-dropout program. Again, if you look at programs
that are trying to reduce dropouts directly, it's a pretty dismal scene. In Gary, there
were positive test score effects for males in grades 4-6. In Seattle- Denver, there
was a positive effect on adults going on in continuing education.
Some of the experiments collected data on low birth weight, nutrition, and
other quality-of-life variables. Low birth weight is associated with very serious
deficits later on in life, and programs that try to reduce the incidence of low birth
weight have been largely ineffective; but the Gary experiment found that NIT
reduced low birth rates in the most at-risk categories. The rural experiment showed
significant effects in various categories of nutritional adequacy. Homeownership
showed significant effects in New Jersey, in the rural experiment, and in the first
year of the Gary experiment.
It is important to map these results into more recent experience, both experimental and non-experimental. Later experiments such as the Minnesota workwelfare reform (MFIP), SSP in Canada, and New Hope in Milwaukee tended to be
work related with strong financial incentives. People who wanted to get benefits
had to work a minimum of hours and, as you would expect, these experimental
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programs elicited greater work effort. But across all the experiments, secondary
earners used some of the benefits to buy more time in the home. Non-experimental
studies using income tax retmns also found effects similar to the NIT. Two-parent
families receiving an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) used some of the extra
income to increase time at home; this was especially true for secondary earners.
The order of magnitude of the labor supply elasticity is essentially the same in
more recent experiments. The Minnesota experiment found positive effects for
marital stability and reduced domestic abuse. The Canadian experiment found an
increase in marital stability in New Brunswick and a decrease in marital stability in
British Columbia. The New Hope experiment found some long-term effects on the
educational performance of males (in the experimental group) in elementary
school.
The Use and Misuse of Experimental Information, Walter Williams

I' m greatly concerned about the growing misuse of policy information in the current political environment. Elliot Richardson ( 1980: I 05), a distinguished secretary
of several United States government departments wrote, "in a sense, all of the
abuses of Watergate have been abuses of information: its theft, distortion, misuse,
fabrication, misrepresentation, concealment and suppression." Today's efforts are
not new, but these activities, with the exception of theft, are much worse today
than in earlier times. And the growing abuses of information undermine informed
consent by the people and ultimately American democracy itself.
I will argue that the negative income tax experiment set a standard in seeking
reliable information, which should be current practice, and that the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO) policy analysis staff of which I was a member
exemplified sound analytic practices. This did not come about because the analysts
involved had greater personal integrity than current practitioners, but because the
political environment facilitated such efforts. It is the deterioration of political
institutions that is the problem, not the skills and standards of today' s policy analysts and researchers.
The policy analysts at OEO were not public relations types but academically
oriented social scientists. They understood that thefr one comparative advantage
was to go after hard evidence on the negative income tax. It is true that the OEO
analytic staff hoped that fam ilies receiving negative income tax payments would
not significantly reduce thefr work efforts. However, and this is critical, they
sought a carefully designed state-of-the-art field experiment to provide a rigorous
assessment of the extent to which negative income tax payment recipients changed
the labor supply response. And the social scientists at the University of Wisconsin
at Madison who were administering the study were even more concerned about
meeting the highest research standards.
The OEO analytic unit had a basic c01ru11itment to increasing the supply of
sound, relevant social policy information and undertook an extensive research
program to develop it. For example, the analytic unit set up and fully funded the
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University of Wisconsin' s Institute for Research on Poverty, and supp01ted in its
initial stage a critically important longitudinal study at the University of Michigan
follo wing 5,000 American families and that has continued for 35 years. OEO
launched the first major, rigorous social policy evaluations and large-scale field
experiments. As to the latter, the New Jersey negative income tax experiment was
funded largely because the OEO analytic office, in summer of 1965, sold agency
director Sargent Shriver on a negative income tax plan, and he recommended it to
the president in that year 's agency submission to the budget bureau. Then in
October 1965, the office sent the budget office a more detailed, more accurate estimate for the cost of a negative income tax aimed at ending poverty by 1976- the
200th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence.
The United States has experienced a radical change in the political environment
since the 1965- 1968 period. During that period, the OEO analytic staff could
engage in sound analyses of the pros and cons of policy options to supp01t agency
decision-making. The commitment to good information at OEO ce1tainly did not
run throughout the government. But, between then and now, the changes that have
come about have been negative. Although emphasis on sound data remains essential for reasoned policymaking, I have found over the years that there is more and
more disto1tion of information and policy analyses. Over time, the willful use of
deceptive statistics and misleading analyses has increased materially, w ith the
current administration using disto1ted evidence as its main weapon in misleading
the public about its major policies.
Our political system has been deteriorating because people in senior positions,
including the highest officials in the White House and Congress, have been propagandizing citizens who often do not perceive the nature and extent of the subterfuge. Take President George W. Bush's 2001 tax bill, where the top one percent of
the income distribution got thuty percent of the tax cuts and the bottom forty
percent got only about fifteen percent. Yet, the Bush administration was able to
pass the tax legislation by engaging in an extended propaganda campaign claiming
falsely that those at the bottom benefited the most.
The overriding problem is that the public is fed distorted information and false
assertions based on it; yet, the politicians lack either the political will or the
institutional capacity to restore integrity to national politics. As I observed in
Reaganism and the Death of Representative Democracy, "The extent to which
deceptive propaganda has been employed in [President George W.] Bush's first
three years to sell major policy proposals makes the Bush administration radically
different from any earlier presidency" (Williams 2003: 259). Ultimately, the issue
is whether the public receives sound policy information and interpretation- prior
to the making of major public decisions-for there to be informed consent. If not,
democracy withers. Policy analysts are accused of aggrandizing the importance of
valid information so let me turn finally to an impeccable source, James Madison,
the father of the Constitution: "The people who mean to be their own Governors
must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives" (Hunt 1910: 103). In sum,
American democracy requires the informed consent of the people on major policy
choices; and such informed consent can come only when the needed relevant
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policy information is available to citizens in time for them to consider the policy at
issue and assent to it.
Political Ramifications of the Experiments, Alice O'Connor

The period we're talking about seems li ke ancient history; not only is there now
less integrity in the inquiries behind policy changes, but also antipoverty is now
easily dismissed as a serious policy objective. Sometimes when I tell my students
that Lyndon B. Johnson made speeches about ending poverty in America, they
laugh. That to me is extraordinarily sad commentary.
The NIT experiments were not just fundamentally scientific undertakings, but
fundamentally political undertakings as well. Within a broader political context,
we need to understand them as experiments whose design, implementation, and
ultimately whose meaning, were all shaped by the volatile and rapidly changing
politics of social provision, social welfare, and social citizenship. We can also see
the experiments as a form of political advocacy- they sought to establish the
legitimacy of the NIT in the absence of widespread political awareness or support.
As a scientific unde1taking, the experiments were highly successful, but as a
political undertaking the experiments had the opposite effect. They were used to
undermine the NIT/BIG concept. More importantly, they show us some of the
fundamental weaknesses of framing the BIG idea narrowly, as a highly targeted
antipoverty measme as opposed to a more universal citizenship right, framing it as
policy with labor-market effects as opposed to an intervention that actively tries to
reshape labor markets. I also want to discuss what the experiments tell us about the
limitations of a style of policy making that looks to these experiments as a source
of policy innovation.
The politics at the time affected the experiments. The guaranteed income was
talked about in the late I 960s as an idea whose time had come, but there was no
significant mobilization in tenns of any grassroots or major constituency groups
like labor behind the idea. Instead, guaranteed income came to the fore with
extremely diverse advocates. There was a group of free market economists who
saw it as an antidote to the bmgeoning welfare state. Some in the civil rights
movement and the growing welfare rights movement ta lked about the NIT as a
response to the problems of structural unemployment in the labor market (as well
as to racism in the labor market and gender bias in the labor market), and activists
attached it to an expanded notion of citizenship rights. Most important of all in
terms of getting these experiments going were the Keynesian economists within
the Johnson administration, specifically within OEO, who came to embrace the
negative income tax as a key to eliminating pove1iy by 1976 as laid out in the fiveyear plan developed by OEO analysts. This group saw the income guarantee as a
supplement to the overriding full employment growth strategy embraced in the war
on poverty.
The experimenters were determined not to advocate someth ing that would violate the basic principles ofa market economy. That is to say, they didn't insist that
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BIG was a response to market failure so much as to the incapacity of certain
segments of people in the labor market to earn adequate wages. The experiments,
therefore, were concerned with proving N1T's efficacy as a tool for raising
incomes above the poverty line, and to prove the hunch (that had been based on
some econ ometric studies) that the NIT could eliminate poverty without a massive
work disincentive and within the boundaries of liberal social policies at the time.
Those wh o held this view saw the N IT as emphasizing growth over redistribution.
They were reluctant to regulate labor markets explicitly, and considered the
antipoverty measures not to be about changing the dynamics of inequality, but
about expanding opportunities to be part of the economic system. As a result, the
experiments were high ly targeted. They focused on the poorest people (up to 150
percent of the pove1ty line), not a broad segment of the population. They were not
concerned with some of the broader labor market effects such as how a basic
income guarantee affects the choice and power of workers to go elsewhere, and did
not attempt to look at the impact on racial or gender segmentation of the labor
market. These problems were not acknowledged within the framework of these
experiments. This leads me to say that the exp eriments were narrowly focused on
indiv idual behavior and predicting it, not on the structural impact of the NIT.
Another kind of politics that shaped the experi ments was the politics of social
provision for poor people. From the standpoint of the economists who designed the
experiments, one of the appeals of income guarantees was that they were efficient
and would cut through some of the inefficiencies of the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children ("welfare") program, and especially wou ld be fairer to the
working poor because they wouldn't be targeted to women w ith children. This led
to a political decision in the New Jersey experiment to focus on two-parent, malebreadwinner families, assuming that welfare mothers (and their potential work
falloff) wouldn't be a maj or political issue at the time. (This despite the fact that in
1967 Congress passed the WIN "work incentives" legislation that tried to put more
welfare recipients to work.) Similarly, the assumption was that the potential work
falloff among wives in two-parent families would not become a political issue. In
fact, however, Nixon later played very heavily on the two-parent/single-parent
divide in promoting his family assistance plan and in his more dedicated efforts to
break up the political coalition behind the Great Society. By pitching his p lan as a
matter of fairness for the forgotten two-parent families who were ineligible for
welfare, he drew a sharp, artificial distinction between the popular, stereotypically
white, two-parent working poor/working-class family, on the one hand, and the
"welfare poor" on the other hand, who were increasingly imagined in the public
mind as predominantly black, drug using, etc.- none of which was true.
These divisive, racial politics quickly came to determine the political meaning
of these experiments. They became political fodder in the N ixon-era wars over
welfare reform. At first, it actually looked like this was going to be a moment of
congruence between research and political priorities: Nixon's Family Assistance
Plan (FAP), after all, was a version of the NIT with a work requirement attached.
Before the results were in, they were able, under extreme pressure from White
House advisor Daniel P. Moynihan, to put together a report that was used in
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testimony in favor of FAP, saying there were no work disincentive effects
whatsoever.
The moment of congruence quickly passed, however. The use of the
experiments in favor ofFAP drew public and political attention to the experiments.
And Senator Williams from New Jersey, an opponent of FAP, used this as an
occasion to sic the General Accounting Office on the experiment, claiming that the
families were doub le-dipping and should be prosecuted for welfare fraud. He tried
to get Congress to invade the office of the experiments and look into the files of
the experimental families. David Kershaw, who was running the experiments,
essentially camped out to prevent congressional investigators from ruining the
confidentiality agreement with the families. Thus, after looking like there was
some congruence between social science and politics, as the war on welfare turned
into a war on dependency, the findings of these experiments were actually used to
undermine the very idea of an income guarantee. As others on the panel have
indicated, the initial rosy scenario from the experiments changed once the longerrange results were in: there was, after all, some measw-able work disincentive from
the guaranteed income, albeit relatively modest and partly due to reduced hours
among secondary as well as primary household earners. There were also the
subsequently challenged findings linking the NIT to family breakup. By the late
1970s, when the Carter administration attempted to revive a version of the NIT,
even some of its former advocates turned against it. Moynihan, in a very public
and I can't help but think, strategically timed manner, said to Congress, "I am
shocked to look at these findings and say we scientists were wrong." Meanwhile,
the right wing mobil ized, in the form of Charles Murray and others, to use these
findings to say that these experiments proved that an income guarantee was
impossible.
A final political dimension to the N IT experiments is that they were considered
highly innovative, not just because they were testing this "idea whose time had
come," but also because they represented a new approach to policy making. It was
thought that an experimental design would give defi nitive proof that an idea can
work. I think it led to consequences that were unanticipated. The experiments
ushered in a ti me of increasing rigor, increasi ng emphasis on experimental design
in program planning and evaluation, but they also helped raise the bar especially
for innovative antipoverty policies, which now had to prove their value before
passage. Antipoverty and welfare policy has been subjected to a scrutiny that is not
applied to other areas of social policy, certainly not to military policy even though
the military costs far more.
To conclude, looking at the NIT experiments as a political undertaking shows
us how politics can confound efforts to inform policy with scientific knowledge.
Even as social scientists were sorting through and debating the meaning of the
experimental findings, political opponents were using those findings to tell a
simple story of lazy poor people and fam ily decline. I would point to the
importance of using the experimental fi ndings to tell a different story, and the
importance of working harder to change th is prevailing narrative with a more complex alternative. And yet, those of us who know better have let the simpler
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narrative rule the day. This also points to the limitations of narrow antipoverty
justifications for an income guarantee. The experiments, like the welfare reform
debate that followed and distorted their meaning, turn on the individual behavior of
poor people; and when we frame this as a behavioral issue, we rarely get the outcome that progressives want. Finally, I think the experiments point to the political
limitations of a style of policy making that doesn't pay enough attention to the
need to articulate research with the needs of social movements at the same time.

Note
* Special thanks to Robert Harris who moderated the session on which this chapter is based
and gave extensive comments on the written version.
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